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Abstract—The security of quantum key distribution protocols 
is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. However, a 
precise analysis of the security properties requires tools from both 
classical cryptography and information theory. Here, we employ 
recent results in non-asymptotic classical information theory 
to show that information reconciliation imposes fundamental 
limitations on the amount of secret key that can be extracted 
in the finite key regime. In particular, we find that an often 
used approximation for the information leakage during one-way 
information reconciliation is flawed and we propose an improved 
estimate. 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Quantum key distribution ( Q K D ) [3], [8] is a prime example 
of the interdisciplinary nature of quantum cryptography and 
the first application of quantum science that matured into 
the realm of engineering and commercial development. While 
the security of the generated key is intuitively guaranteed by 
the laws of quantum mechanics, a precise analysis of the 
security requires tools from both classical cryptography and 
information theory (see [17], [25] for early security proofs 
and [23] for a comprehensive review). This is particularly 
relevant when investigating the security of Q K D in a practical 
setting where the resources available to the honest parties are 
finite and the security analysis consequently relies on non-
asymptotic information theory. 
In the following, we consider Q K D protocols between two 
honest parties, Alice and Bob, which can be partitioned into 
the following rough steps. In the quantum phase, N physical 
systems are prepared, exchanged and measured by Alice 
and Bob. In the parameter estimation (PE) phase, relevant 
parameters describing the channel between Alice and Bob are 
estimated from correlations measured in the quantum phase. 
I f the estimated parameters do not allow extraction of a secure 
key, the protocol aborts at this point. Otherwise, the remaining 
measurement data is condensed into two highly correlated bit 
strings of length n in the sifting phase — the raw keys Xn for 
Alice and Yn for Bob. We call n the block length and it is 
the quantity that is usually limited by practical considerations 
(time interval between generated keys, amount of key that has 
to be discarded in case Alice and Bob create different keys, 
hardware restrictions). In the information reconciliation (IR) 
phase, Alice and Bob exchange classical information about 
Xn over a public channel in order for Bob to compute an 
estimate Xn of Xn. The confirmation (CO) phase ensures that 
Xn = Xn holds with high probability or aborts the protocol. 
Finally, in the privacy amplification (PA) phase, Alice and 
Bob distill a shared secret key of £ bits from Xn and I " . We 
say that a protocol is secure i f (up to some error tolerance) 
both Alice and Bob hold an identical, uniform key that is 
independent of the information gathered by an eavesdropper 
during the protocol, for any eavesdropper with access to the 
quantum and the authenticated classical channel. 
The ratio £/N is constrained by the following effects: 1) 
Some measurement results are published for PE and subse-
quently discarded. 2) The sifting phase removes data that is 
not expected to be highly correlated, thus further reducing 
the length n of the raw key. 3) Additional information about 
the raw keys is leaked to the eavesdropper during the IR and 
CO phase. 4) To remove correlations with the eavesdropper, 
Xn and Xn need to be purged in the PA phase, resulting in a 
shorter key. Some of these contributions vanish asymptotically 
for large N while others approach fundamental limits.1 
Modern tools allow to analyze QKD protocols that are 
secure against the most general attacks. They provide lower 
bounds on the number of secure key bits that can be extracted 
for a fixed block length, n. For the BB84 protocol, such proofs 
are for example given in [22], [24] and [9]. These proofs were 
subsequently simplified to achieve better key rates in [31] 
and [12], respectively. A l l results have in common that the 
key rate that can be achieved with finite resources is strictly 
smaller than the asymptotic limit for large n — as one would 
intuitively expect. 
We are concerned with a complementary question: Given 
a secure but otherwise arbitrary QKD protocol for a fixed n, 
are there fundamental upper bounds on the length of the key 
that can be produced by this protocol? Such bounds are of 
theoretical as well as practical interest since they provide a 
benchmark against which contemporary implementations of 
QKD can be measured. In the asymptotic regime of large block 
lengths, such upper bounds have already been investigated, 
for example in [19]. Here we limit the discussion to IR and 
focus on bounds that solely arise due to finite block lengths 
Consider, for example, BB84 with asymmetric basis choice [15] on a 
channel with quantum bit error rate Q. There, contributions 1) and 2) vanish 
asymptotically while contributions 3) and 4) converge to h(Q). 
(Sec. I I ) . We complement the bounds with a numerical study 
of achievable leak values with L D P C codes (Sec. I I I ) , and 
study some possible improvements and open issues (Sec. I V ) . 
I I . F U N D A M E N T A L L IMITS FOR RECONCILIATION 
We consider one-way I R protocols, where Alice first com-
putes a syndrome, M G A4, from her raw key, Xn, and 
sends it to Bob who uses the syndrome together with his 
own raw key, Yn, to construct an estimate Xn of Xn. We 
are interested in the size of the syndrome (in bits), denoted 
log \A4\, and the probability of error, P r [ X n ^ X " ] . In most 
contemporary security proofs log \A4\ enters the calculation of 
the key rate rather directly.2 More precisely, to achieve security 
it is necessary (but not sufficient) that 
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where leakgc is the amount of information leaked to the 
eavesdropper during IR. Since it is usually impossible to 
determine leak^c precisely, this term is often bounded as 
leak^c < logl-A^I. In the following, we are thus interested 
in finding lower bounds on log |A^|. 
Let PXY be a probability distribution. We say that an IR 
protocol is e-correct on PXY i f it satisfies P r [ X n ^ Xn] < e 
when Xn and Yn are distributed according to (PXY)XU. 
Any such protocol (under weak conditions on PXY and for 
small e) satisfies 1 log |A^| > H(X\Y)p [28]. Moreover, 
equality can be achieved for n —> oo [26]. On first sight, 
it thus appears reasonable to compare the performance of 
a finite block length protocol by comparing log |A^| with 
its asymptotic limit. In fact, for the purpose of numerical 
simulations, the amount of one-way communication from 
Alice to Bob required to perform IR is usually approximated 
as leakEc ~ £-nH(X\Y)p, where £ > 1 is the reconciliation 
(error correction) efficiency. The constant £ is often chosen 
in the range £ = 1.05 to £ = 1.2.2 However, this choice is 
scarcely motivated and independent of the block length, the 
bit error rate and the required correctness considered. 
Here, we argue that this approximation is unnecessarily 
rough in light of recent progress in non-asymptotic information 
theory. Strassen [27] already observed in the context of noisy 
channel coding that the asymptotic expansion of the funda-
mental limit for large n admits a Gaussian approximation. This 
approximation was recently refined by Polyanskiy et al. [21] 
(see also [11]). The problem of information reconciliation — 
also called source compression with side information — was 
investigated by Hayashi [10] and recently by Tan and Ko-
sut [28]. Here we go slightly beyond this and provide bounds 
on the asymptotic expansion up to third order: 
Theorem 1. Let 0 < e < 1 and PXY arbitrary. Then, for large 
n, any e-correct IR protocol on PXY satisfies 
log \A4\ > nH(X\Y) + ynV(X\Y) «J>~ (1 — e) 
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Fig. 1: The solid lines show the fundamental limit of the 
efficiency, £(n,e;Q), as a function of n for different values 
of Q and e. The dotted lines show fits (see Table I) to Eq. (4) 
for simulated LDPC codes (marked with symbols). 
where H(X\Y) := Exp [log „ Y ] is the conditional entropy, 
V(X\Y) := Var [log
 p Y ] is the conditional entropy vari-
ance, and $ is the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
Moreover, there exists an e-correct IR protocol with log | M | < 
nH(X\Y) + \/nV(X\Y) $ _ 1 ( 1 — e) + 1 logn + O(l). 
The proof uses standard techniques, namely Yassaee et 
al.’s achievability bounds [36] and an analogue of the meta-
converse [21]. We omit it here due to space constraints and 
refer to the full version [32]. Note that the gap between 
achievable and converse bounds is logn, which leaves room 
for improvements. In channel coding, the gap is at most 
7T logn, and constant for certain channels (see, e.g., [2], [29], 
[33] for recent work on this topic). 
We are in particular interested in the situation where PXY 
results from measurements on a channel with (independent) 
quantum bit error rate Q, as it for example occurs in BB84 [3] 
or the 6-state protocol [5]. Here, we (at least) require e-
correctness for the distribution 
2 
logn — O(l), 
2Recent works analyzing the finite block length behavior using this approx-
imation include [1], [4], [6], [12], [14], [24], [31]. 
i ^ y ( 0 , 0) = P y y ( l , 1) = 
i ^ y ( 0 , 1) = Pyy( l ,0 ) = 
1 — Q 
Q 
and 
2 
The distribution ( P ^ F ) n describes a typical manifestation of 
two random strings for which the expected bit error rate is 
Q. For the following, we thus say, that a IR protocol is 
(e, Q)-correct i f it e-correct on P^Y. We show the following, 
specialized bounds: 
Corollary 2. Let 0 < e < 1 and let 0 < Q < h. Then, for 
large n, any (e, Q)-correct IR protocol satisfies 
1 
log |All > £(n, e; Q) • nn(Q) logn — Oyl), where 2 
(2) 
£(n, e; Q) := 1 + 1 ^ ^ * - i ( i _ e ) . 
n /i(Q) 
Here, h{x) = —xlogx — (1 — x) log( l — x) and v{x) = x ( l — 
x) log ( x / ( l —x)). Furthermore, there exists a (e, Q)-correct 
IR protocol with log |Af | < £(n, e; Q)-n/i(Q) + 4 logn+0(T) . 
The proof of Eq. (2) follows by specializing Theorem 1 to 
the distribution P^y 
Numerical simulations reveal that the approximation in 
Corollary 2 is very accurate even for small values of n. More 
precisely, we establish an analytical bound, Eq. (3) on the 
next page, where F-1 (• ;n,p) is the inverse of the cumulative 
distribution function of the binomial distribution. This bound 
can be evaluated numerically even for reasonably large n. 
I I I . RESULTS 
As shown above, log|Af| ~ £(n,e;Q)nh(Q) is theo-
retically achievable and optimal up to additive constants. 
This implies, for example, that the approximation log |Af | ~ 
l.lnh(Q) is provably too optimistic i f £(n, e;Q) > 1.1, e.g. 
for n < 104, Q = 2.5% and e = 10-2 . The function 
£( •, e; Q) is plotted in Fig. 1 for different values of e and Q. 
However, theoretical achievability only ensures the existence 
of a code without actually constructing it; in particular, it is 
not known if efficient codes used in practical implementations 
can achieve the above bound. Hence, the approximation given 
in Corollary 2 is generally too optimistic and must be checked 
against what can be achieved using state-of-the-art codes. 
We suggest that practical information reconciliation codes 
for finite block lengths should be benchmarked against the 
fundamental limit for that block length, and not against the 
asymptotic limit. Moreover, we conjecture that, for some 
constants £ i , £2 > 1 depending only on the coding scheme 
used, the leaked information due to information reconciliation 
can be approximated well by 
leakEc ~ £1 • nh(Q) + £2 • \/nv(Q) «J> (1 — e) (4) 
for a large range of n and Q as long as e is small enough. 
Here, £1 measures how well the code achieves the asymptotic 
limit (1st order) whereas £2 measures the 2nd order deficiency. 
In the following we test this conjecture against some state-
of-the-art error correcting codes and find £1 and £2 for these 
codes. Furthermore, we are concerned with the following sys-
tem design question: given a reconciliation failure probability e 
and block length n, what is the leakage expected in practice? 
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Fig. 2: Simulated block error rates e of LDPC codes of length 
n = 103 and n = 104 and coding rates R = 0.6, R = 0.7 and 
R = 0.8 as a function of quantum bit error rate Q. 
For this numerical analysis we focus on low-density parity-
check (LDPC) codes following several recent implementations 
[16], [20], [35]. 
We constructed a set of LDPC codes with the progressive 
edge algorithm (PEG) [13] using the following degree poly-
nomials: 
Ai(x) = 0.1560x + 0.3482x +0.1594x +0.3364x 
A2(x) = 0.1305x + 0.2892x +0.1196x +0.1837x 
+ 0.2770x 
A3(x) = 0.1209x + 0.2738x +0.1151x +0.2611x 
+ 0.2291x 
where Ai(x), A2(x) and Xs(x) were designed for coding rates 
0.6, 0.7 and 0.8, respectively [7]. 
Fig. 2 shows the block error rate of the codes with rates 
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and lengths 103, 104 as a function of Q. The 
thick lines connect the simulated points while the dotted lines 
represent a fit following Eq. (4) (the fit values can be found 
in Table I). The fit perfectly reproduces the so-called waterfall 
region of the codes. However, Eq. (4) drops sharply with Q 
for Q G [0,0.1] while LDPC codes experience an error floor. 
In this second region the fit can not approximate the behavior 
of the codes. 
In Fig. 1 we plot the function £(n,e;Q) and the efficiency 
results obtained with LDPC codes. We chose as representative 
lengths 103, 104, 105, and 106. For every block length we 
constructed codes of rates 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8 following Ai(x) , 
A2(x) and Xs(x). The points in the figure were obtained 
by puncturing and shortening the original codes [16] until 
the desired block error rate was obtained. The results show 
an extra inefficiency due to the use of real codes. This 
inefficiency shares strong similarities with the converse bound, 
its separation from the asymptotic value is greater for lower 
values of Q, block error rates and lengths and fades as these 
parameters increase. For example, for n = 104, Q = 1.0% 
log \A4\ > nh(Q) + n( l — Q) — F (e(l + 1/i/n); n, 1 — Q J — 1 log 1 — Q 1 
Q log n — log -2 e 
(3) 
and e = 10-2 the extra inefficiency due to the use of real 
codes is over 1.2 while for n = 106, Q = 5.0% and e = 1 0 - 1 
the extra inefficiency is close to 1.05. 
Finally, we address the design question posed above, that 
is, we study the efficiency variation as a function of the block 
error rate for fixed n and Q. For this setting we need code 
constructions that allow to modulate the rate with fixed block-
length. The most natural modulating option would have been 
to construct codes for every n of interest and augment [18] 
the codes, that is, eliminate some of the restrictions that the 
codewords verify. However, it is known that LDPC codes do 
not perform well under this rate adaptation technique [34]. In 
consequence, we constructed a different code with the PEG 
algorithm for every rate. In order to obtain a smooth efficiency 
curve we used the degree polynomials Ai (x), A2 (x) and A3(x) 
for constructing all codes even with coding rates different to 
the design rate. 
Fig. 3 shows the efficiency as a function of the block error 
rate. Each of the two subfigures (a) and (b) show the simulation 
results for codes of length 103 and 104, respectively. Colours 
blue and red correspond to Q = 1.5% and 3.0% in subfigure 
(a) and to 2.5% and 4.0% in subfigure (b). The solid lines show 
the bound given by Corollary 2, similar to Fig. 1 we observe 
that, ceteris paribus, lower values of Q imply higher values 
of £. The points show values achieved by LDPC codes: each 
point represents the block error rate of a different parity check 
modulated code. Finally the dotted lines show the best least 
squares fit to Eq. 4, the values of £1 and £2 can be found in 
Table I. From these curves we can extract some useful design 
information, 1) if the target failure probability is very high 
[16] then the gain obtained by increasing the block length is 
modest, 2) if the target failure probability is low (below 10-4) 
the leakage is over a fifty percent larger than the optimal one 
for moderate block lengths and 3) for block-length 105, the 
largest length for which we could compute simulations in the 
whole block error rate region, we were unable to consistently 
offer efficiency values below 1.1 and furthermore we report 
no point with / below 1.05. 
Table I shows the values of £1 and £2 used in Figs. 1, 2, 
and 3 to fit the data points obtained from the simulations. 
In these curves £1 is — independently of e, n, Q — in the 
range [1.05,1.16] while the 2nd order deficiency £2 is more 
sensible to the parameter variations. For the first four rows, 
that correspond to Fig. 1 with fixed Q and e, £2 is in the range 
[2.41, 3.82], for the middle six rows, that correspond to Fig. 2 
with fixed n and leak, £2 is in the range [149,1.96], while for 
the last four rows, that correspond to Fig. 3 with fixed n and 
Q, £2 is in the range [1.26,1.58]. Note that for each scenario, 
the averages in these ranges could safely be used for system 
design purposes since necessarily codes with those £1 and £2 
values or better exist. 
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Fig. 3: Ratio between the leakage and the asymptotical op-
timum in several scenarios as a function of the block error 
rate e. Subfigures (a) and (b) show results for block lengths 
103 and 104, respectively. In each subfigure the solid lines 
show the converse bound from Corollary 2 while the dotted 
lines show the values achieved with actual LDPC codes. 
I V . CONCLUSION 
In this paper we studied the fundamental limits for informa-
tion reconciliation in the finite key regime. These limits imply 
that the commonly used approximation log |A^| ~ l.lnh(Q) 
is too optimistic for a range of error rates and block-lengths, 
and proposed a two-parameter approximation that takes into 
account finite key effects. 
We compared the finite length limits with L D P C codes and 
found a consistent range of achievable finite-length efficien-
cies. These efficiencies should be of use to the quantum key 
distribution systems designer. One question that we leave open 
is the study of these values for different coding families. 
Finally, it is clear that P E and P A also contribute to finite-
length losses in the Q K D key rate. While it seems possible 
TABLE I: Values of ξ1 and ξ2 for the fitted curves in Fig. 1–3. 
n 
-
-
-
-
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Q 
0.010 
0.025 
0.050 
0.050 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.015 
0.030 
0.025 
0.040 
e 
10- 2 
10- 2 
10- 2 
1 0 - 1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
leak 
4 
3 
2 
4 
3 
2 
-
-
-
-
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
-
-
-
-
c
 1 
1.13 
1.07 
1.06 
1.05 
1.11 
1.12 
1.13 
1.07 
1.08 
1.11 
1.16 
1.16 
1.14 
1.07 
£2 
3.82 
3.71 
3.54 
2.41 
1.39 
1.45 
1.69 
1.41 
1.44 
1.89 
1.52 
1.31 
1.26 
1.58 
to investigate fundamental limits in PA based on the normal 
approximation of randomness extraction against quantum side 
information [30] as a separate problem, we would in fact need 
to investigate it jointly with I R since there is generally a trade­
off between the two tasks that needs to be optimized over. 
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